Showing posts with label sovereign bonds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sovereign bonds. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 17, 2016

17/2/16: Another Germanic policy straightjacket


My comment on the Germany's "Sages" proposal for sovereign bonds bail-ins rule for Portugal's Expresso: http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2016-02-16-Risco-de-um-ataque-especulativo-as-dividas-dos-perifericos.



In English unedited:

The proposed 'sovereign bail-in' mechanism represents another dysfunctional response to the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. The mechanism de facto exposes sovereigns locked in a currency union to the full extent of monetary and fiscal risks that reside outside their control, while reinforcing the risks arising from their inability to control their own monetary policies.

Under the current system, a run on the sovereign debt in the markets for any individual state can be backstopped via ESM as a lender of last resort. In a normally functioning currency union, such a run can be backstopped also via monetary policy and fiscal mechanisms.

In contrast, within the proposed bail-in system, both the ESM and the monetary policy become unavailable when it comes to securing a backstop against a market shock. The full extent of a run on Government bond for a member state will befall the fiscal authorities of the member state - aka the taxpayers who will end up paying for bonds bail-ins through higher yields of Government debt and fiscal squeeze on expenditure and taxation.

In theory, a bail-in mechanism for sovereign debt can be implemented in the presence of three key conditions:

  • firstly, the implementing country must have control over its own monetary policy; 
  • secondly, the implementing country must have benign debt levels and low reliance on concentrated holdings of its debt, especially in the systemically important institutions (for example by a handful of larger banks); and 
  • thirdly, the implementing country must have strong fiscal balancesheet to absorb shocks of risk-repricing during the period of bail-in rule introduction. 
None of these conditions are satisfied by the Euro 'periphery' states today, nor are likely to be satisfied by them in the foreseeable future. At least two of the three necessary conditions are not satisfied by the vast majority of the Euro area states at the moment and are also unlikely to be satisfied by them in the foreseeable future.

In a sense, we are witnessing another attempt to put Euro area into a Germanic policy straightjacket in a hope that this time around, the outcome will be different and that bail-ins rules will fix the unresolvable dilemmas inherent in the Euro design. It is a vain hope and a futile exercise that is creating more risks in exchange for no tangible gain.

Thursday, December 10, 2015

10/12/15: Europe's Negative Yields Ship of Fools


Those of you who follow my work would know that I hold little compassion for the 'investors' who are willing to give money away to the governments whilst whingeing about high rates of taxation they endure on their incomes. Well, Europe is full of this sort of investors:


And it is getting more full by the minute at EUR2.7 trillion and counting. So, happy waisting your money...

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

30/10/2013: Desperate? Just Check Out Italy's Latest Thoughts on Bonds...


Just when you think they (the Governments) have run out of creative ways to load risks onto taxpayers in order to boost sales of debt to fund own empires... here comes Italy with new twist on financial engineering in sovereign debt space: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/italy-derivatives-guarantees-idUSI6N0HU01420131021

Desperate? You bet What will they think up next?..

H/T to @greentak

Monday, June 24, 2013

24/6/2013: The Great (Credit) Wall of China

China is now in the anteroom of the 'This Time is Different' sauna... hot seat awaiting:
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/21/say_hello_to_chinas_brewing_financial_crisis

Keep in mind, in China total credit increased from USD9 trillion in 2008 to USD23 trillion now. Credit to GDP ratio went up ca 95% and now stands at 221% of GDP. In the US, in 2002-2007 period, credit/GDP ratio grew by 40 percentage points. And we have no real idea just how deep the real rabbit hole goes: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21578668-growth-wealth-management-products-reflects-deeper-financial-distortions

Here's the contagion trigger: once China gets seated on the hot bench in the TTisD sauna, Chinese purchases of US and euro area bonds will evaporate. With this, yields will be going up even if current QE is retained by the Fed. And what the cost? BIS estimated last 1 trillion. And with yields rising across the board, 15-35 percent of GDP can go up in smoke in France, Italy, the UK and Japan.

Meanwhile, the euro area banks are sitting on a massive pile of dodgy assets (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1862013-size-of-eurotanics-bad-assets.html) backed by funding secured against... right... the aforementioned government bonds.

In this blog parlance, the Impossible Monetary Dilemma will then hit the Great Wall of China. And there are no airbags...


Sunday, May 26, 2013

26/5/2013: FTT v Sovereigns' Addiction to Debt



FT.com reports (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3121802-c480-11e2-9ac0-00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fhome_us%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2UQE68h14) that 

"The European Central Bank has offered to help the EU redesign its financial transactions tax to avoid any ‘negative impact’ on market stability, highlighting official fears about the implementation of the levy."

So far so good, as FTT indeed is likely to cut liquidity in the markets, reducing markets efficiency, and potentially increasing volatility, rather thane educing it.

Of course, the original idea the EU came up involved levying tax on trading in bonds, equities and derivatives. So one would expect the following prioritisation from the ECB concerned with markets impacts:
1) Not to distinguish between bonds and equities in tax application and rates, as the two instruments are de facto long-only instruments in either corporate (real) economy, banks (financial economy) and sovereigns (for bonds - which somewhat qualifies as a real economy as well).
2) Levy tax primarily on derivative instruments (although here, tax can be avoided much easier)
3) Recognise that in the restricted competition environment and with legacy subsidies from the crisis period still in place for incumbent financial institutions, any FTT will be at least in part passed onto retail investors and savers, and in more extreme cases - e.g. duopoly model of banking in Ireland - onto all retail users of banking services)
4) Real economy - incomes, investment, entrepreneurship, unemployment, etc - will be most impacted by the FTT levied on real assets - equities and some (not all) bonds and this effect will be stronger the stronger is the banking and investment banking sector concentration in the economy.

Alas, as is clear from the FT.com article, the ECB is not concerned with (3) and (4) whatsoever, and it is unconcerned with (1) either. It also seems to be aware of (2) pitfalls. Aside from that, ECB is concerned with the perennial task faced by all European Government - the obsession of raising as much tax revenue as possible while incentivising more debt pumped into sovereign bond markets.


Per FT.com: "The ECB believes markets should efficiently “transmit” changes in interest rates to the real economy." You might think that this means transmitting higher (lower) ECB rates into higher (lower) (a) Government bond yields and (b) higher/lower cost of private credit. Err… you would be wrong.

Per FT.com there are rumours that "…the ECB would prefer to have a limited UK-style stamp duty on equities". What can possibly go wrong, then?

ECB concern is clearly to grease the wheels of sovereign bond markets. The fact that FTT will reduce markets liquidity in real instruments & will cost retail investors in the end - well, that is hardly ECB's concern at all. ECB like the EU Governments is only worried about own coffers & give no attention to the economy.  

Equity markets volatility (FTT original raison d'être is to reduce volatility) had NOTHING to do with the current crises. The ECB focus on 'UK-styled stamp duty on equities', if confirmed, thus exposes FTT as a pure scam to raise more tax revenues, not a measure to deal with 'markets instability'. 

As FT.com quotes one of the market participants: "bond markets were a “phenomenally attractive” way of channelling savings into investment." Alas, it is not - corporate bonds are debt. Shoving more debt while disincentivising equity investment is not a great idea for long term sustainable funding.

In Europe, lending money to Governments, including to fund dodgy unfunded pensions and white elephant projects, is tax-wise deemed to be more laudable than to invest in equity of real enterprises. By corollary, lending to companies is also deemed to be more preferential than funding them via equity. One of the outcomes of this decades-long preferential treatment of debt is the current crisis: over-bloated and under-funded public spending coupled with too much private debt (including banking debt) against too little equity (the latter imbalance drove the bailouts of banks in euro area periphery).

With this in mind, talking about 'Robin Hood' taxes on Financial Services in EU is equivalent to believing in Santa's Magic raindeer as a viable alternative for public transport.

Friday, May 3, 2013

3/5/2013: Basel 2.5 can lead to increased liquidity & contagion risks


Banca d'Italia research paper No. 159, "Basel 2.5: potential benefits and unintended consequences" (April 2013) by Giovanni Pepe looks at the Basel III framework from the risk-weighting perspective. Under previous Basel rules, since 1996, "…the Basel risk-weighting regime has been based on the distinction between the trading and the
banking book. For a long time credit items have been weighted less strictly if held in the trading book, on the assumption that they are easy to hedge or sell."

Alas, the assumption of lower liquidity risks associated with assets held on trading book proved to be rather faulty. "The Great Financial Crisis made evident that banks declared a trading intent on positions that proved difficult or impossible to sell quickly. The Basel 2.5 package was developed in 2009 to better align trading and banking books’ capital treatments." Yet, the question remains as to whether the Basel 2.5 response is adequate to properly realign risk pricing for liquidity risk, relating to assets held on trading book.

"Working on a number of hypothetical portfolios [the study shows] that the new rules fell short of reaching their target and instead merely reversed the incentives. A model bank can now achieve a material capital saving by allocating its credit securities to the banking book [as opposed to the trading book], irrespective of its real intention or capability of holding them until maturity. The advantage of doing so is particularly pronounced when the incremental investment increases the concentration profile of the trading book, as usually happens for exposures towards banks’ home government. Moreover, in these cases trading book requirements are exposed to powerful cliff-edge
effects triggered by rating changes."

In the nutshell, Basel 2.5 fails to get the poor quality assets risks properly priced and instead created incentives for the banks to shift such assets to the different section of the balance sheet. The impact of this is to superficially inflate values of sovereign debt (by reducing risk-weighted capital requirements on these assets). Added effect of this is that Basel 2.5 inadvertently increases the risk of sovereign-bank-sovereign contagion cycle.

The paper is available at: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/qef159/QEF_159.pdf

Thursday, February 28, 2013

28/2/2013: Risk-free assets getting thin on the ground


Neat summary of the problem with the 'risk-free' asset class via ECR:


Excluding Germany and the US - both with Negative or Stable/Negative outlook, there isn't much of liquid AAA-rated bonds out there... And Canada and Australia are the only somewhat liquid issuers with Stable AAA ratings (for now). Which, of course, means we are in a zero-beta CAPM territory, implying indeterminate market equilibrium and strong propensity to shift market portfolio on foot of behavioural triggers... ouchy...

Thursday, February 14, 2013

14/2/2013: New Compensation Model for Rating Agencies



I wrote yesterday about two studies on the effectiveness of the rating agencies (link here). Another interesting study on the agencies and their performance was published in Spring 2012 issue of the Journal of Structured Finance (vol 81 number 1, pages 71-75). Authored by Malesh Kotecha, Sharon Ryan, Roy Weinberger and Michael DiGiacomo and titled Proposed Reform of the Rating Agency Compensation Model, the study looks at the current model of rating agencies compensation - the so-called issuer-pay model whereby issuer of securities being rated paying for the rating delivery - in light of the apparent conflicts of interest implicit in the model. The authors propose an alternative model based on fee levied on new issues and secondary markets trade. Fees would be deposited in a dedicated fund which will pay these out to the rating agencies. The agencies will be rotated on a performance basis, taking into account accuracy of their ratings over time.

The criticism of such an approach to compensation model - as noted by the authors - stems from 
-- the disincentive to rating agencies under the proposed changed model to innovate in ratings models development (higher potential errors etc)
-- the fact that the US bonds market is global in coverage and thus requires competitive pricing systems, 
-- difficulty of devising a merit-based rotating system and setting appropriate levels of fees; and
-- the new model introducing a transactions tax.

Overall, the weakest point of this proposal is undoubtedly its failure to consider the US markets role as global issuance platform with any transaction tax eroding cost competitiveness and the failure in recognising that global scope of rating agencies and the US markets also implies severe limits on new compensation model ability to capture the activities of these agencies.

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

13/2/2013: Rating Agencies Role & Effectiveness: 2 recent studies


In light of all the cases being filed against the rating agencies and in light of the general controversy surrounding them, here are two recent papers dealing with the topic of rating agencies performance and the links between their ratings and investors' decisions.

One interesting paper was published in the Journal of Banking & Finance )vol 36, number 5, May 2012, pages 1478-1491) by Thomas Mahlmann titled "Did Investors Outsource Their Risk Analysis to Rating Agencies? Evidence from ABS-CDOs".

The paper looks at the floating-rate tranches from collateralised debt obligations (CDO) backed by asset-backed securities to test whether yield spreads at the point of issuance (origination) act as good predictors of future performance. The paper found that, once we control for rating at issuance and other deal-specific data, yield spreads do indeed indicate future performance. However, this result is primarily due to tranches that were initially rated below AAA.

The study concludes that at the issuance / origination, investors did not rely only on ratings, when pricing the CDOs studied. The study econometric evidence also indicates that ratings were inadequate for CDOs because these instruments are much riskier than corporate bonds.

Another paper, published in the International Journal of Finance and Economics (March 2012) by Eduardo Cavallo, Andrew Powell and Roberto Rigobon, titled "Do Credit Rating Agencies Add Value? Evidence from the Sovereign Rating Business" look at the credit downgrades made during and after the financial crises asking whether rating agencies opinions provide any incremental information to the market.

The answer to the question is yes. Rating agencies opinions on sovereign risks do explain a portion of variation in three macroeconomic variables, relevant to the market: exchange rates, stock market indices and future sovereign bond spreads, once the authors control for observed bond spreads.

The study also found that rating agencies upgrades (downgrades) are correlated with:

  1. decreases (increases) in the spreads one day forward;
  2. increases (decreases) in the stock market;
  3. nominal exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) relative to the USD.
Top level conclusion: the ratings do contain information about specific credit and the rating's informational content is in addition to other publicly available market data, such as credit spreads.

Monday, October 29, 2012

29/10/2012: More on CDS markets woes


Few days ago I mentioned I stopped watching CDS on a daily basis... and here is more on the same: link.

Well done, Europe. Nothing like sledgehammering the markets. Step next: shove loads of sovereign debts into ESM, OMT and on the 'emergency' lending lines at ECB and NCBs. That'll teach the markets how to price risk.


Tuesday, October 23, 2012

23/10/2012: Signs, Indicators and Noise


From time to time in the past I used to look at CDS spreads for sovereigns. I have not done so in a while. In fact, I have not even updated my database for these in a while. Why? Because something is dodgy about the sovereign assets' market that is manipulated by the sovereigns. And here's a quote from the TF Market Advisors that sums it up well enough:

"One of the effects of the central bank policies is that many of the more obscure parts of the market that you could look to for clues or early warning signs have been eliminated. Sure these markets still exist, but the information from them is so manipulated that it is difficult to get a clear read."

  1. LIBOR : "Between Fed lending programs, LTRO, and the lawsuits, I have no clue what to make of LIBOR other than it probably isn’t a whole lot of use as a sign of anything."
  2. EUR/USD 3 month basis swap : "...was another useful indicator showing the relative strength of US banks versus European banks. Again with LTRO and various central bank global swap lines, this measure has become useless. With banks willing to use central bank liquidity without fear of reprisals or negative stigma, they do, and this rate hovers right around where the governments would like it to be."
  3. European sovereign CDS : "has become far more difficult to interpret as all these naked bans get enforced. French CDS went from 106 on the 11th of October to 65 today, in pretty much a straight line. I have difficulty thinking of one real reason that France could have done so well – they have funded ESM, instituted some domestic policies that seem dubious at best, have had weak economic data, and are marching to the beat of their own drum in the Euro in a way that indicates willingness to take on more debt, yet they are tighter. This makes it hard to figure out what is going on in European bank CDS."
  4. US Treasury Yields : "...are very difficult to figure out. The Fed owns over 35% of treasuries with maturities 5 years and longer. Almost everything you would look at and try and infer from the treasury market is skewed by that."
  5. Economic data "has even come under attack. In general I don’t believe the data is manipulated, particularly not for political purposes (but there are a growing number of people who do). But I do think they try and cover up their own mistakes. Jobless claims came in at 337k or something (pre upward revision) two weeks ago. There was a lot of concern, and some very good economists spoke to the BLS and came up with the conclusion that one big state had not sent in their quarter end revisions in time. There was some confirmation of this, but then some sort of denial. Missing the deadline would be an honest mistake in my opinion, it shouldn’t happen, but I can see how it could. Then last week, we posted 388k as the number. Now we have data that looks like 369k, 342k, and 388k. Is the reality that had they properly accounted for the missing number, that the claims have been 369k, 365k, 365k? If so, we have okay but steady claims. If the actual data is correct (which I don’t think it is) then we would have seen some euphoric hiring followed by aggressive firing. I find that harder to believe."
Note, I wrote about US jobless claims figure here.

There is a major problem, folks. While we can debate the numbers left, right and center, what is clear is that the current environment (political, monetary and policy) is becoming less and less transparent. The market signals are being distorted (willingly and via the law of unintended consequences) and this does not bode well for the future. 


Monday, March 12, 2012

12/3/2012: Summary of latest CDS moves

A neat summary from 9/3/2012 note by markit for 5-year CDS:


And let's leave it without a comment.

H/T to @EconBrothers 

Monday, January 16, 2012

16/1/2012: Summary of S&P move and more

In the wake of the S&P action it is a good idea to put side-by-side some ratings on euro area countries. here are S&P ratings before and after downgrade along with CMA ratings and CDS data for Q1 2009 beginning of the crisis) and Q4 2011.


Per S&P: "...the agreement [between euro zone member states in December 2011 attempting to address the crisis] is predicated on only a partial recognition  of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems  primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness  between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe  that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers' rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national  tax revenues."

In other words, it's growth, stupid. And herein lies the main problem for Europe. While EU might - if forced hard enough - jump onto a more sustainable fiscal spending path (cut deficits and structural deficits) - the EU has absolutely no record of creating pro-growth conditions or environments. In fact, in a bizarre response to the S&P moves:

  • France is discussing an increase in VAT as the means for stimulating productivity growth, while
  • Austria is planning wealth taxes and increase in retirement age as its response to economic growth challenge.
Now, where do you start in dealing with this lunatic asylum? 

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

21/09/2011: Risk focus swings?

What gives, folks:

Tables below show the swing in risk assessments away from PIIGS to net contributors to the EFSF/EFSM/ESM alphabet soup concocted by the EU to powder over the gaping wounds left by the earlier stages of sovereign debt crisis. Why?

Absent long-term trend we can only speculate, but can it be the ever-widening liability being loaded on Finland, Austria and Netherlands under the current euro area 'burden-sharing' arrangements? Or are the markets re-assessing the prospects for the euro bonds?

Monday, September 5, 2011

05/09/2011: Ackermann: cover us

Deutsche Bank CEO, Josef Ackermann, speaking today at a conference "Banks in Transition", organized by the German business daily Handelsblatt in Frankfurt, made some far reaching comments on the state of European banking system.

"We should resign ourselves to the fact that the 'new normality' is characterized by volatility and uncertainty... All of this reminds one of the autumn of 2008." And as a reminder of these very days 3 years ago, the ECB reported that banks have raised their overnight deposits with ECB to €151 billion - the highest level in more than 12 months. Overnight deposits with ECB are seen as a safe haven as opposed to lending money in the interbank markets, with latest spike suggesting that even European banks are now becoming weary of lending to each other.

Crucially, according to Ackermann, "it is an open secret that numerous European banks would not survive having to revalue sovereign debt held on the banking book at market levels" to reflect their current market value. This is an interesting point - not because it is novel (every dog in the street knows that to be true), but because it is being made by the man who leads the largest banking institution in the land where banks have vigorously fought EBA on methodology and disclosure of stress test results. The battle line drawn back then was precisely their sovereign bond holdings.

And there is an added contradiction in what Ackermann was saying - if banks in Europe will not survive mark-to-market revaluation of their books, then how come Mr Ackermann claims they don't require urgent recapitalization?

In truth, Ackermann was really saying that were the banks in Europe forced to mark-to-market their holdings of PIIGS and Belgian bonds, they would take such losses that can lead to destabilization of banks equity valuations across the EU, thus triggering calls on governments' funding, which will therefore destabilize the bonds markets. Truth hurts, folks. It hurts over and over again when it is denied.

Mr Ackermann also appears to be saying: "Hey politicians. Don't force us to fix our books to the market. Fix the market for us."

Ackermann also repeated his earlier statement that calls for robust and rapid recapitalization of the banks were "not helpful" and threatened to undermine European efforts to assist crisis-stricken euro-zone sovereigns. In his view, such a recapitalization would send the message that the EU had little faith in its own strategy for dealing with the crisis. In other words, in Ackermann's view, if banks need urgent capital to cover losses on sovereign bonds, then the current valuations of these bonds in the market are irreversible. Which, of course, would mean that all efforts of the EU to roll back sky-high yields on PIIGS + Belgian debt are not likely to produce long-term results any time soon.

Which brings us to the point of asking: if so, why the hell are we burning through tens of billions of ECB and taxpayers' funds to buy out sovereign bonds and repay banks bond holders? Is it simply an exercise of buying time?

Another interesting comment from Ackermann relates to longer term prospects of the banking sector: "Prospects for the financial sector overall ... are rather limited... The outlook for the future growth of revenues is limited by both the current situation and structurally." What this means is that with regulatory tightening, new capital requirements (both on quality and quantity of capital) and with devastated savings and investment portfolia of investors, plus rising taxes on income and capital, margins in the banking sector will be depressed over long term horizon, while more risk averse investors will be weary of buying into higher margin high risk structured products.

In other words, all that Mr Ackermann's speech today amounts to is a call by a banker on the European governments to cover up the banks' cover up of losses: "Print money, buy out our bonds, but don't restructure or recapitalize us".

But Ackermann's warning presents an even more dire warning for the Irish officials who have made significant bets (using taxpayers money) on Irish banking sector returning to high rates of profitability soon. If Ackermann is correct and long term profitability of the entire sector is on decline, Irish banks will be unlikely to recover without a dramatic restructuring of their books.

Monday, June 7, 2010

Economics 07/06/2010: Moving to the next stage in Euro crisis

Last Friday, speaking at the CPA annual conference (will be posting the highlights of the speech here later) I referred to a new 'beast' of the sickly-prickly Eurostates: the BAN-PIIGS. The new bit - 'BAN' - referred to Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands.

Fast forward two days, getting off the trans-Atlantic flight in hot and humid New York guess what hits my news feed? Belgium and France taking in water on the back of Hungary's woes (see earlier post here) and Ukraine is putting some new pressures on Euro area banks. French and Belgian CDS are moving up, while Austria is also back in the spotlight.

Brian Lenihan's announcement that Irish banks will be rolling over €74.2bn of guaranteed loans, bonds, and other systemic support papers before October 1 guarantee is scheduled to run out is not helping the markets either. As Morgan Kelly, Karl Whelan and couple other analysts estimated - once again well ahead of our gallant DofF 'forecasters' - everyone dependent on the Irish government guarantees will be pushing their re-scheduling/roll-overs before October hits.

Surprised? You see - we used to have one main crisis back in 2008-2009: insolvency of banks balancesheets. It should have been resolved directly through recapitalization of the banks via equity take overs by the taxpayers and restructuring of the banks debts. Foolishly, we chose a different path:
  • We facilitated banks rolling over debt - as if changing maturity date on the bonds that cannot be serviced changes the level of debt impacting the banks;
  • We then proceeded to allow banks to name their capital requirements by allowing them to spread their losses over longer time horizon, as if changing the date of repayments start on a defaulting loan can make the loan perform;
  • Following this, we pumped the banks with steroids of ECB facilitated lending - as if swapping few private bonds for ECB loans resolves the problem of balance sheet overhang;
  • We created Nama to take bad loans off the banks balancesheets, but, realising the futility of the undertaking, went on to impose unrealistically low haircuts that simply sped up some of the very process of losses recognition in the second bullet point above. Given the levels of real impairments on the loans, Nama only bought banks more time to spread their losses, thus avoiding recognizing the problem of weak balance sheets and amplifying the problem of insolvency;
  • Amidst all of this, banks became liquidity traps - sucking up vast amounts of funding. This was not fully satisfied by the ECB, so the banks engaged in predatory re-pricing of performing loans (mortgages etc) in a futile effort to get some more cash flowing;
  • The insolvency crisis blew up into a liquidity crisis.

So now we have both. And no real way of resolving either or both.

We could have sustained this game, teetering on the brink between full insolvency and a credit crunch, if and only if the euro bonds markets were at the very least stable and the ECB was capable of parking collateral garbage it collected in exchange for banks loans for a long time. Alas, two things are currently under way.

First, the French bonds have slid off their 'safe heaven' pedestal over the last couple of weeks, with spreads over the German bund going up eight-fold since the end of 2009. French bonds are now posing massive liquidity risk to institutionals holding them. French Prime Minister declared last week that: “I only see good news in parity between euro and dollar”. In effect, the French are now openly inviting massive devaluation of the euro - something that is bound to disappoint Germany.

Second, there is no room for more Quantitative Easing, as the ECB has been exposed as an institution that has run out of reserves cover for its own operations. Last week, ECB balancesheet had more than 150% ratio of immediate liabilities to assets held. And that was only for liabilities vis-a-vis Greek rescue package.

Something will have to give, folks. Just as Ireland has precipitated its own implosion by pushing the liquidity crisis on top of our already formidable insolvency crisis, so the ECB and the entire euro zone is now working hard to achieve the same. We are now well behind that point of no return in monetary policy where promises to act with support for the sovereign bonds will be sufficient to stave off a run on the bond yields. Instead, the ECB's rhetoric will be tested, leaving it only one option - start running printing presses.

Now, those of you who followed my writings on the issue will say 'Good, we need a massive - €3-5 trillion - issuance of cash, don't we?' The problem is that while the answer is 'yes, we do', this emission cannot simply involve purchasing of more Government bonds. We need a direct, un-levered injection of new money into the system and it must be broadly based - going not just to the public coffers, but to private economies of the Euro area as well. ECB printing cash to buy Government debt will not reduce the debt levels for the Eurozone sovereigns (which means insolvency problem will remain and will actually increase), nor will it resolve the problem of liquidity crunch in the block (giving money to the Governments to finance roll over of existent debt is about as liquidity-enhancing as burning this cash in a fireplace).

The end game, in my view, can be only across three major disruptions in the euro assets:
  • Collapse of the euro below parity of the US dollar; followed by
  • Debt restructuring through offers to the bondholders to take a haircut (possible ranges: 35-50% for Greece and Portugal, 25-30% for Spain, 20% for Ireland and Italy, 15-20% for Austria, Belgium... and so on). These will be attempted first privately - via larger institutional consortia, with both sticks (threat of default) and carrots (some sort of delayed tax incentives?) being deployed to get larger institutional holders to accepts a drastic shave off; and once this is underway, the inevitable conclusion to the crisis will be:
  • Imposing haircuts on banks bondholders, with the ECB standing by to hose the banks with cash, should liquidity dry up during the haircut imposition.
Finale: euro's credibility gone, euro/usd rate below parity persists, inflation will be running ahead of economic recovery and Europe will slide into a Japan-styled long-term depression.

In the mean time, before the end game, expect more bans on trading in various instruments (the French have finally agreed to the German-style ban on naked shorts) and more fiery rhetoric about speculators, destabilizing market forces and other gibberish from the dear leaders of Europe.


PS: All of this reminds me of a conversation I had with one very senior stocks analyst/strategist back in the middle of 2008 meltdown in the markets. I was concerned that the ways in which fiscal and monetary authorities were throwing cash at the banks were going to lead to both running out of policy space to continue accelerated supports for the sector and economy at large. "Charged by the bear, make sure you don't run out of all bullets early on. You might miss," I insisted. In response I was given a complete assurance that resolute actions on large scale (equivalent to unloading the entire magazine of ammunition at the shadow of the problem before actually having an idea as to what the problem really is) will mean that the 'Bear won't be charging for long'. I wish I was wrong... He still writes daily, weekly and monthly missives about the investment strategy for clients.